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As former Chief Justice Boochever correctly observed, the Alaska
wrongful death statute "establishes a dichotomy between, on the one'
hand, situations where a decedent leaves a husband, wife, children or
other dependents, and, on the other hand, §ituations where there are
no survivors in those categories."'
If the decedent is survived by *a spouse, children, or other depen-
dents, the personal representative brings an action for wrongful death
on behalf of the surviving spouse, children, or other dependents. The
damages recoverable in such a case are measured by losses to the sur-
viving spouse, children, or other dependents. The personal representa-
tive is a nominal party only and holds the recovery in trust for the
exclusive benefit of these parties. Since the damages recoverable are
measured by the losses to the individual statutory beneficiaries, the
allocation of settlements will be in accordance with the losses suffered
by each of the surviving beneficiaries, without regard to the decedent's
will or, in the absence of a will, to the laws of intestate succession.
Since the personal representative holds the amounts recovered only as
a trustee for the surviving spouse, children, and other dependents,
these amounts are not assets of the decedent's estate and are not sub-
ject to claims of decedent's creditors or to estate or inheritance taxes.
On the other hand, if the deceased is not survived by a spouse,
children, or other dependents, the personal representative brings an
action for wrongful death on behalf of the estate. The personal repre-
sentative is the real party in interest. The damages are those measured
by the pecuniary loss to the estate. Since the amount recovered as
damages for pecuniary loss to the estate "shall be administered as
other personal property of the deceased person," 2 the amount recov-
ered will pass to the decedent's beneficiaries in accordance with his
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1. Brown v. Estate of Jonz, 591 P.2d 532, 536 (Alaska 1979) (Boochever, C.J.,
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will or, in the absence of a will, in accordance with the laws of intes-
tate succession. Since the damages recovered are assets of the estate,
they are subject to the claims of creditors and to estate and inheritance
taxes.
In 1966 this writer presented a paper entitled "Damages for
Wrongful Death in Alaska" before the first educational program spon-
sored by the Alaska Academy of Trial Lawyers. The paper was pub-
lished later that year as an article in the now defunct Alaska Law
Journal.3 At the time the article was published, there had been no
Alaska Supreme Court decisions addressing what damages may be re-
covered for wrongful death in Alaska or how those damages may be
measured. The article examined the territorial history, both legislative
and judicial, of Alaska's wrongful death statute,4 survival statute,5 and
parental cause of action statute,6 and attempted to predict what deci-
sions the Alaska Supreme Court would make when it did address legal
issues under these statutes. The article noted that the wrongful death
statute contained the dichotomy observed by Justice Boochever and
recommended that it should be remedied by further statutory
amendment.
More than twenty-three years have now passed since the publica-
tion of that article. During this time, the Alaska Supreme Court on
several occasions has addressed what damages are recoverable under
Alaska's wrongful death statute and how those damages are measured.
Unfortunately, the court has not, as yet, directly addressed these issues
as they arise under the survival statute or the parental cause of action
statute. The Alaska legislature has made no substantive amendments
to any of the statutes under which damages for wrongful death may be
recovered since the first state legislature in 1960. This article reviews
the legislative and judicial history of the statutes under which damages
for wrongful death may be recovered contained in the 1966 article,
analyzes the decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court and the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska interpreting those stat-
utes, and suggests an amendment to the wrongful death statute that
might eliminate some perceived inequities caused by the dichotomy in
the statute.
Part II of this article contains the legislative and judicial history
of the Alaska wrongful death statute. This section charts the evolu-
tion of the present Alaska wrongful death statute from an old Oregon
3. 4 ALASKA L.J. 113, 129, 145 (1966).
4. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1983). At the time of the 1966 article the Alaska
wrongful death statute was cited as ALASKA STAT. § 13.20.340.
5. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.570 (1983). At the time of the 1966 article the Alaska
survival statute was cited as ALASKA STAT. § 13.20.330.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 09.15.010 (1983).
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statute on which it was based, through the statute contained in the
civil code for the Territory of Alaska adopted by the United States
Congress in 1900, through the various amendments made by the terri-
torial legislature, to the last substantive amendments made in 1960 by
the first Alaska state legislature. This section shows the dichotomy in
the Alaska wrongful death statute and its historical genesis.
Part III of the article examines decisions of the Alaska Supreme
Court interpreting the wrongful death statute where decedent is sur-
vived by a spouse, children, or other dependents. This section first
addresses the difficult issue of who are "other dependents" within the
meaning of the wrongful death statute. The section then examines the
specific items of damage that the supreme court has held to be recover-
able under the Alaska wrongful death statute and how those damages
are measured. Finally, the section examines how lump-sum settle-
ments are allocated among multiple beneficiaries of the decedent
under the wrongful death statute, with some comments on the survival
statute and how lump-sum settlements for wrongful death should be
allocated between damages recoverable under the wrongful death stat-
ute and those recoverable under the survival statute.
Part IV of the article examines the measure of damages for loss to
the estate where a decedent is not survived by a spouse, children, or
other dependents. Since such decedents are frequently children, the
section also addresses the parental cause of action statute, its history,
and, it is submitted, an erroneous interpretation of that statute by the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska.
The article concludes in Part V with an examination of some hy-
pothetical cases which demonstrate perceived unjust and unfair results
in the award of damages for wrongful death as a consequence of the
dichotomy in the Alaska wrongful death statute. The section also con-
tains a proposal for amendment of the Alaska wrongful death statute
which would eliminate these perceived unjust and unfair results.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ALASKA WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
The Alaska wrongful death statute has evolved through numer-
ous statutory amendments and judicial interpretations. The statute
had its genesis in an old Oregon statute which read:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omis-
sion of another, the personal representative of the former may main-
tain an action at law therefor against the latter, if the former might
have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter, for an
injury done by the same act or omission. Such action shall be com-
menced within two years after the death, and the damages therein
shall not exceed five thousand dollars and the amount recovered, if
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any, shall be administered as other personal property of the de-
ceased person .... 7
The Oregon cases interpreting this statute prior to 1900 held that
the measure of damages was the pecuniary loss to the estate by reason
of the death rather than the loss to the beneficiaries. The recoverable
damages were the difference between the value of the decedent's estate
at the time of the death and the probable value of the estate had the
decedent survived to the end of his life expectancy.8
In 1900, Congress enacted a civil code for the Territory of Alaska
which was taken largely from the Oregon code.9 The wrongful death
statute enacted in the Alaska code was taken from the Oregon statute
quoted above, but additional language was incorporated into the stat-
ute which provided that, if the decedent left a surviving spouse or chil-
dren, the amount recovered would be exclusively for them, and only
when there was no surviving spouse or children would the amount
recovered be administered as other personal property of the estate.
Thus, the first Alaska wrongful death statute read:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omis-
sion of another, the personal representatives of the former may
maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might
have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter for an
injury done by the same act or omission. Such action shall be com-
menced within two years after the death, and the damages therein
shall not exceed [five] ten thousand dollars, and the amount recov-
ered, if any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's hus-
band or wife and children when he or she leaves a husband, wife, or
children, him or her surviving, and when any sum is collected it must
be distributed by the plaintiff as if it were unbequeathed assets left in
his hands, after payment of all debts and expenses of administration,
and when he or she leaves no husband, wife, or children, him or her
surviving, the amount recovered shall be administered as other per-
sonal property of the deceased person; but the Plaintiff may deduct
therefrom the expenses of the action, to be allowed by the proper
court upon notice, to be given in such manner and to such persons
as the court deems proper.10
7. OREGON LAWS ANN. § 371 (Hill 1892), quoted in Perham v. Portland Gen.
Elec. Co., 33 Or. 451, 458, 53 P. 14, 16 (1898) and Wien Alaska Airlines v. Sim-
monds, 241 F.2d 57, 58-59 (9th Cir. 1957).
8. Perham v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 33 Or. 451, 466-67, 53 P. 14, 19 (1898);
Carlson v. Oregon Short-Line Ry., 21 Or. 450, 456-57, 28 P. 497, 499 (1892).
9. City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 207 (Alaska 1962) (quoting T.
CARTER, ANNOTATED ALASKA CODES xviii (1907)).
10. THE LAWS OF ALASKA, CODE CIV. PROC. § 353 (ed. Carter 1900) (enacted
by the United States Congress: Act of June 6, 1900, c.786, 31 Stat. 321, 392). The
convention followed in this article to indicate amendments to statutes is that language
deleted by the amendment will be enclosed in brackets and language added by the
amendment will be italicized.
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The Alaska wrongful death statute was first construed by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jennings v. Alaska Treadwell Gold
Mining Co. I I In Jennings, the decedent left no spouse or children sur-
viving. The court noted the language in the Alaska statute that Con-
gress had added to the Oregon statute from which it was taken and
reasoned that the addition did not affect the situation where no spouse
or children survived the decedent. The court then followed the Ore-
gon decisions and held that the measure of damages was the loss to the
estate.'
2
In Wien Alaska Airlines v. Simmonds, 13 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals was presented with its first opportunity to construe the
statute where a spouse and children did survive the decedent. In
Wien, the court held that where a spouse and children survived the
decedent the measure of damages was the pecuniary loss to the survi-
vors, not the loss to the decedent's estate.14
In 1955, prior to the trial but subsequent to the accrual of the
claim in Wien, ' 5 the territorial legislature significantly amended the
wrongful death statute for the first time since its enactment in 1900.
First, the legislature raised the maximum amount of recoverable dam-
ages to $50,000. Next, the legislature deleted the language surviving
from the Oregon statute which provided that when a decedent is not
survived by a spouse or children "the amount recovered shall be ad-
ministered as other personal property of the deceased person," and in
its place inserted that the damages recovered where no spouse or chil-
dren survived would be for the benefit per capita of grandchildren, if
any, or the surviving parent or parents of the decedent. Finally, the
legislature provided that "[i]n determining the amount of the award,
11. 170 F. 146 (9th Cir. 1909). During territorial days, appeals from the United
States District Courts for the Territory of Alaska were to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. As the highest appellate court for the interpretation of Alaska law, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals functioned as the "territorial supreme court" and its
decisions on Alaska law were binding on United Stated District Courts for the Terri-
tory of Alaska, the territorial trial courts.
12. Id. at 149. Loss to the estate was also adopted by the territorial trial courts as
the measure of damages when the decedent was not survived by a spouse or dependent
children. Linge's Adm'r v. Alaska Treadwell Co., 3 Alaska 9, 13-14 (1906); Kreidler
v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 10 Alaska 365, 367 (1943). In Kreidler, it appears that
decedent was actually survived by adult, non-dependent children. The court applied a
loss to the estate measure of damages for the wrongful death without any discussion of
whether the survival of children mandated another measure of damages.
13. 241 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1957).
14. Id. at 58. A territorial trial court decision also adopting pecuniary loss to the
surviving spouse and children as the measure of damages when a spouse or children
survive the decedent is Dralle v. Steele, 13 Alaska 680, 688 (1952).
15. Id. at 58 n.2.
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the court or jury shall consider but is not limited to.. ." six specified
items of damage:
(1) Deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits to the
beneficiary or beneficiaries, without regard to the age thereof, that
would have resulted from the continued life of the deceased and
without regard to probable accumulations or what the deceased
may have saved during his lifetime.
(2) Loss of contributions for support.
(3) Loss of assistance or services irrespective of age or rela-
tionship of decedent to the beneficiary or beneficiaries.
(4) Loss of consortium.
(5) Loss of prospective training and education.
(6) Medical and funeral expenses. 16
In 1957, the legislature again amended the statute. It deleted
grandchildren and parents as statutory beneficiaries for whom dam-
ages for wrongful death could be recovered and reinserted the lan-
guage from the 1900 statute that when a decedent is not survived by a
16. In its entirety, the statute enacted in 1955 read as follows:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of
another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action
therefore against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action,
had he lived, against the latter for an injury done by the same act or omis-
sion. Such action shall be commenced within two years after the death, and
the damages herein shall not exceed [ten] fifty thousand dollars, and the
amount recovered, if any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the dece-
dent's husband or wife and children, him or her surviving; [and when any
sum is collected it must be distributed by the plaintiff as if it were unbe-
queathed assets left in his hands, after payment of all debts and expenses of
administration, and when he or she leaves no husband, wife, or children, him
or her surviving, the amount recovered shall be administered as other per-
sonal property of the deceased person; but the plaintiff may deduct there-
from the expenses of the action to be allowed by the proper court upon
notice, to be given in such manner and to such persons as the court deems
proper.] or leaving no husband, wife or children surviving then and in that
event for the benefit per capita of the child or children of the decedent's child
or children, if any, and the surviving parent or parents of the decedent. When
the Plaintiffprvails, the trial court shall determine the allowable costs and
expenses of the action and may, in its discretion, require notice and hearing
thereon. The amount recovered shall be distributed only after payment of all
costs and expenses of suit and debts and expenses of administration.
The damages recoverable under this Act shall be limited to those which
are the natural and proximate consequence of the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of another.
In fixing the amount of damages to be awarded under this Act, the Court
or jury shall consider all the facts and circumstances and from them fix the
award at such sum as will fairly compensate for the injury resulting from the
298 [Vol. 5:293
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spouse or children "the amount recovered shall be administered as
other personal property of the deceased person."'
17
In 1960, the first state legislature made the last substantive
18
amendments to the statute. The legislature removed the limitation on
the maximum recoverable damages and substituted that the damages
shall be "such... as the court or jury may deem fair and just"; it
added "other dependents" to the class of beneficiaries for whose bene-
fit damages for wrongful death may be recovered; and it limited the
death. In determining the amount of the award, the Court or jury shall con-
sider but is not limited to the following:
(1) Deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits to the benefici-
ary or beneficiaries, without regard to the age thereof, that would have re-
sulted from the continued life of the deceased and without regard to probable
accumulations or what the deceased may have saved during his lifetime
(2) Loss of contributions for support.
(3) Loss of assistance or services irrespective of age or relationship of
decedent to the beneficiary or beneficiaries.
(4) Loss of consortium.
(5) Loss of prospective training and education.
(6) Medical and funeral expenses.
The death of a beneficiary or beneficiaries before judgment shall not af-
fect the amount of damages recoverable hereunder.
The right of action hereby granted shall not be abated by the death of a
person named or to be named the defendants.
Act, ch.153, 1955 Alaska Sess. Laws 315.
17. The relevant portion of the statute as amended read:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of
another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action
therefore against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action,
had he lived, against the latter for an injury done by the same act or omis-
sion. Such action shall be commenced within two years after the death, and
the damages therein shall not exceed fifty thousand dollars, and the amount
recovered, if any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's hus-
band or wife and children when he or she leaves a husband, wife or children,
him or her surviving; [or leaving no husband, wife or children surviving then
and in that event, for the benefit per capita of the child or children of the
decedent's child or children, if any, and the surviving parent or parents of
the decedent] and when he or she leaves no husband, wife or children, him or
her surviving, the amount recovered shall be administered as other personal
property of the deceased person.
Act, ch.6, 1957 Alaska Sess. Laws 7.
18. In 1972, the wrongful-death statute was moved from Title 13, ALASKA STAT.
13.20.340, to Title 9, ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580, as part of the Act adopting the
Uniform Probate Code. Act, ch. 78, § 4, 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws 120-21. The statute
was revised in 1983 to eliminate gender references pursuant to Act, ch.58, § 4, 1982
Alaska Sess. Laws. By this revision, "decedent's husband or wife and children when
he or she leaves a husband, wife or children" was changed to "decedent's spouse and
children when decedent is survived by a spouse or children," and "decedent leaves no




damages recoverable to "pecuniary loss" 19 when the decedent is not
survived by a spouse, children, or other dependents.
The Alaska wrongful death statute as it presently exists and has
existed virtually unchanged since 1960, reads as follows:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act
or omission of another, the personal representatives of the former
may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former
might have maintained an action, had the person lived, against the
latter for an injury done by the same act or omission. The action
shall be commenced within two years after the death, and the dam-
ages therein shall be the damages the court or jury may consider fair
and just, and the amount recovered, if any, shall be exclusively for
the benefit of the decedent's spouse and children when the decedent
is survived by a spouse or children, or other dependents. When the
decedent is survived by no spouse or children or other dependents,
the amount recovered shall be administered as other personal prop-
erty of the deceased person, but shall be limited to pecuniary loss.
When the Plaintiff prevails, the trial court shall determine the al-
lowable costs and expenses of the action and may, in its discretion,
require notice and hearing thereon. The amount recovered shall be
distributed only after payment of all costs and expenses of suit and
debts and expenses of administration.
(b) The damages recoverable under this section shall be lim-
ited to those which are the natural and proximate consequence of
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of another.
(c) In fixing the amount of damages to be awarded under this
section, the court or jury shall consider all of the facts and circum-
stances and from them fix the award at such sum as will fairly com-
pensate for the injury resulting from the death. In determining the
amount of the award, the court or jury shall consider but is not
limited to the following:
19. The relevant portion of the statute as amended read:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of
another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action
therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action,
had he lived, against the latter for an injury done by the same act or omis-
sion. Such action shall be commenced within two years after the death, and
the damages therein shall, [not exceed fifty thousand dollars] be such dam-
ages as to the court or jury may deem fair and just and the amount recovered,
if any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's husband or wife
and children when he or she leaves a husband, wife or children, him or her
surviving or dependents; and when he or she leaves no husband, wife or chil-
dren, him or her surviving; or other dependents, the amount recovered shall
be administered as other personal property of the deceased person but shall
be limited to pecuniary loss. When the Plaintiff prevails, the trial court shall
determine the allowable costs and expenses of the action and may, in its
discretion, require notice and hearing thereon. The amount recovered shall
be distributed only after payment of all costs and expenses of suit and debts
and expenses of administration.
Act, cl. 163, 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws 259.
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(1) deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits
to the beneficiary or beneficiaries, without regard to age
thereof, that would have resulted from the continued life of the
deceased and without regard to probable accumulations of
what the deceased may have saved during his lifetime;
(2) loss of contributions for support;
(3) loss of assistance or services irrespective of age or re-
lationship of decedent to the beneficiary or beneficiaries;
(4) loss of consortium;
(5) loss of prospective training and education;
(6) medical and funeral expense.
(d) The death of a beneficiary or beneficiaries before judg-
ment does not affect the amount of damages recoverable hereunder.
(e) The right of action hereby granted is not abated by the
death of a person named or to be named the defendant. 20
III. DAMAGES WHERE THE DECEDENT IS SURVIVED BY A
SPOUSE OR CHILDREN OR OTHER DEPENDENTS
A. Who are "Other Dependents?"
In the 1960 amendment, the legislature added "other depen-
dents" to "spouse or children" as the class of persons for whose exclu-
sive benefit damages for wrongful death are recovered. 2 1 Although it
is usually clear who a decedent's spouse or children are, it is not clear
who a decedent's "other dependents" are.
The issue of who are "other dependents" first came before the
Alaska Supreme Court in In re Estate of Pushruk.22 In Pushruk, the
decedent left his mother as his sole legal heir. It was stipulated that
the decedent's mother was not dependent on the decedent at the time
of his death. The personal representative of the estate argued, how-
ever, that "dependent" within the meaning of the Alaska wrongful
death statute includes those who can show that they would have be-
come dependent on the deceased had he survived. Presumably, the
personal representative was prepared to show that had decedent lived,
his mother would have become dependent upon him in her old age;
thus, the personal representative argued that the mother should be
considered a dependent for whose exclusive benefit damages for
wrongful death are recovered. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected
the personal representative's argument and held that dependency is a
factual matter that must be determined according to the facts and cir-
cumstances existing at the time of death. 23 Since the decedent's
mother was not dependent upon him at the time of death, she could
20. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1983).
21. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
22. 562 P.2d 329 (Alaska 1977).
23. Id. at 332.
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not be considered an "other dependent" for whose benefit the damages
for wrongful death may be recovered.
The next case addressing the issue of "other dependents" to come
before the Alaska Supreme Court was Brown v. Estate of Jonz 24 In
Brown, the decedent was survived by his widow, a child born of his
marriage to the widow, and three non-adopted stepchildren who lived
with decedent and were solely supported by decedent. The widow
commenced an action for wrongful death of decedent on behalf of her-
self, decedent's natural child, and the three non-adopted stepchildren.
The widow contended that the non-adopted stepchildren were either
"other dependents" or "children" within the meaning of the Alaska
wrongful death statute. The trial court ruled in pretrial motions that
the stepchildren were not in the class of beneficiaries for whose benefit
damages for wrongful death could be recovered. On appeal, the
Alaska Supreme Court declined to review the trial court's ruling be-
cause the widow failed to preserve the issue by not objecting to an
instruction to the jury that "[t]he word heir of decedent Russell
Brown as used in these instructions refers to Onita J. Brown, his
widow, and Marie Nicole Brown, his daughter," and by not offering
other instructions on the issue.25 In a footnote, the supreme court ex-
pressly stated: "In declining to review this issue [of whether stepchil-
dren are 'other dependents'], it is not our intention to imply either
agreement or disagreement with the superior court's construction of
the Alaska Wrongful Death Act."'26
In a ringing dissent, Justice Boochever contended that "it was
plain error not to instruct that the stepchildren of Russell Brown, who
were completely dependent upon him at the time of his death, were
'other dependents' " entitled to recover damages to them caused by
the wrongful death of their stepfather.27 Justice Boochever quoted
with approval In re Estate of Pushruk concerning the history and pur-
pose of the 1960 amendment which added "other dependents" to the
class of beneficiaries for whose exclusive benefit damages for wrongful
death may be recovered:
Considering the history and purposes of the statute, this amend-
ment appears designed to protect the interest of those who, like chil-
dren and spouses, will suffer financial loss. The term "dependents"
provides for all such persons without creating either an excessively
narrow or an overbroad classification. Thus, dependency is a ques-
tion of fact. 28
24. 591 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1979).
25. Id. at 533.
26. Id. at 535 n.8.
27. Id. at 536 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting).
28. Id. (Boochever, C.J., dissenting) (quoting In re Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d
329, 331 (Alaska 1977)).
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Justice Boochever concluded that "the failure to instruct that the de-
pendent children were entitled to recover results in a miscarriage of
justice."2 9
The most recent case addressing the issue of "other dependents"
is Greer Tank and Welding, Inc. v. Boettger.30 In Boettger, the dece-
dent, Sam Boettger, had married Louella Boettger in May 1965. At
the time of their marriage, Louella had a son, Todd, born in July 1964.
While Sam was very devoted to Todd and treated him like his own
son, he never formally adopted him. A child, Forrest, was born of the
marriage. Sam and Louella were divorced in 1968, largely because
Sam, in order to earn enough money to support his family, was away
from home too much for Louella. After the divorce, Sam sent money
to her irregularly in varying amounts, depending on how he was do-
ing. The couple remarried about a year after the divorce, in part be-
cause Louella was pregnant with their second child, Danielle. They
were divorced a second time in 1972, again because Sam's job as a
long-haul truck driver required him to be away from home too much.
After the second divorce, Sam continued to provide irregular support
to the family and would stay with the family for short periods when he
was near their home in Seattle, Washington. Sam was killed in 1975
while en route to Alaska to investigate job possibilities. Louella
brought an action for wrongful death on behalf of herself, Sam's chil-
dren, Forrest and Danielle, and her child, Todd.
The defendant Greer's first contention was that, as a matter of
law, Louella and Todd could not be "other dependents" under the
Alaska wrongful death statute because Sam owed no legal duty of sup-
port to them. Sam was divorced from Louella at the time of his death
and he had never adopted Todd. The court rejected this contention
and adopted Justice Boochever's reasoning in his dissent in Brown v.
Estate of Jonz that dependency is a question of fact, not of legal rela-
tions. The court held:
We believe that the legislature, by adding "other dependents" to the
categories of spouse and children, intended to embrace those who
occupy a position similar to those in the specified classes and who
were actually dependent upon the decedent for support at the time
of his death. A showing must be made of actual dependency for
significant contributions of support over a sufficient period of time
to justify the assumption that some contribution would have
continued.31
Greer next contended that even if Louella and Todd were not
barred as a matter of law from being "other dependents," they were
not as a matter of fact dependent upon Sam for their support. The
29. Id. at 538 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting).
30. 609 P.2d 548 (Alaska 1980).
31. Id. at 551.
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court also rejected this contention, finding that "[a]lthough Sam's con-
tributions to his family were not regular, and varied in amount, we
believe that they were sufficient to enable us to uphold the trial court's
ruling." 32
Justices Conner and Burke dissented on the grounds that they
could "find no justification for including Louella and Todd within the
intendment of the wrongful death statute" because "[a]t the time of a
decedent's death there existed no cognizable legal relationship between
the decedent and either Louella or Todd."' 33 Justice Burke added that
he thought "it quite remarkable that Greer should now find itself le-
gally obligated to pay money to persons to whom the decedent himself
owed no such obligation at the time of his death."'34
Although Boettger may have been correctly decided on its facts,
the open-ended holding, that dependency is purely a matter of fact at
the time of death, results in considerable uncertainty as to what types
of relations can result in a dependency. A non-spouse companion with
whom a decedent had cohabitated but not married, and to whom he
had given partial support, would probably be a dependent; but would
an occasional lover upon whom the decedent irregularly bestowed
gifts? How long must a cohabitation endure to create a factual depen-
dency? How much financial support must the decedent have contrib-
uted to create a dependency? Could a long-time employee be a
"dependent" if he or she could show factual dependency upon employ-
ment with the decedent? The determination of dependency as a ques-
tion of fact must be developed by further judicial decision.
B. Recoverable Items of Damage
1. Loss of Contributions for Support. Paragraph (c)(2) of the
Alaska wrongful death statute directs the court or jury to consider
"loss of contributions for support" in determining the amount of dam-
ages to be awarded. In most wrongful death cases where the decedent
is survived by a spouse, children, or other dependents, the largest item
of recoverable damage to the surviving beneficiaries is the loss of con-
tributions for their support which they would have received from the
decedent had the decedent lived to his or her probable life expectancy.
The measure of damages for loss of contributions for support was
first considered by the Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Guinn.3 5
Robert Guinn died as a result of an automobile accident. His surviv-
ing spouse, Mary Guinn, commenced an action for wrongful death as
administratrix of his estate on behalf of herself and their child, Celeste,
32. Id.
33. Id. at 553.
34. Id. (emphasis in original).
35. 555 P.2d 530, 544-47 (Alaska 1976).
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against the State of Alaska. The case was tried to the court without a
jury, as was then required for actions against the State of Alaska.36
The court first determined that the State of Alaska was legally respon-
sible for the death of Robert Guinn. It then considered the question of
damages.
Richard Solie, a consulting economist, had testified as an expert
witness on behalf of Guinn on the issue of damages. His calculations
concerning the loss of contributions for support incurred by the sur-
viving beneficiaries were largely adopted by the trial court in fixing an
award. In his testimony, Dr. Solie projected the probable gross in-
come that Guinn would have made between the time of his death and
the end of his working life expectancy based upon the following as-
sumptions: that Guinn would have remained employed by his em-
ployer, Wien Airlines, during the balance of his thirty-eight-year
working life expectancy; that he would have been promoted to the po-
sition of a dispatcher; and that he would have received the automatic
increases in the wage rate based on length of service contained in the
union contract with the employer.37 Dr. Solie then calculated the
amount that Guinn would have spent on personal consumption be-
tween the time of his death and the end of his probable working life
expectancy. This calculation was based upon consumption figures fur-
nished by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
36. The former Alaska Statute § 09.50.290, in effect since statehood, required ac-
tions against the state to be tried to the court; it was repealed by Act, ch. 147 § 1, 1975
Alaska Sess. Laws.
37. Most of the state's attack on the methodology employed by Dr. Solie in com-
puting probable future gross earnings concerns whether the court could consider the
automatic increases in the wage rate contained in the union contract. At the time of
the trial, the Alaska Supreme Court had held in Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 671
(Alaska 1967), that in computing future lost income in personal injury or wrongful
death cases, the trier of fact could not consider probable future inflationary increases
in the general wage scale nor, on the other hand, could it discount to its present value
the gross amount of the probable future income loss. The Beaulieu court reasoned
"that the rate of depreciation and the value of the dollar, attributable to ongoing infla-
tion, approximately offsets the financial windfall otherwise attributable to a failure to
discount to present value." State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, at 545. In State v. Guinn,
555 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976), the court held that while the trier of fact could not con-
sider general inflationary wage increases in computing future lost income, it could
consider fixed step increases contained in the union contract. The holding no longer
has the importance that it had at that time because of the "tort reform" legislation
passed in 1986 where, among other things, the legislature provided that the finder of
fact must reduce future economic damages to present value, but when computing the
amount of wages the injured party could have been expected to earn during future
years, the finder of fact may take "into account future anticipated inflation and rea-
sonably anticipated increases in the injured party's earnings.. . " unless "the parties
agree that the award of future damages may be computed under the rule adopted in
the case of Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967)." ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.040(b), (c) (Supp. 1988).
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Statistics. Dr. Solie deducted the amount attributed to Guinn's per-
sonal consumption from the amount projected as gross future earn-
ings. He determined that the remainder represented the income which
would have been directly or indirectly available as support to the sur-
viving spouse and child had Guinn lived to the end of his probable
working life expectancy. 38
The Alaska Supreme Court approved the general methodology
used by Dr. Solie. The state argued that the consumption figure which
Dr. Solie used was too low. The court would not consider this argu-
ment because the state did not challenge the accuracy of the testimony
at the trial level and "it does not appear that it was clear error to rely
on the methodology to which Dr. Solie testified. ' 39 The state also ar-
gued that since the Alaska wrongful death statute required the trier of
fact to "fix the award at a sum which will fairly compensate for the
injury resulting from the death, the award is to be evaluated as if it
were the principal of an annuity contract, for the purpose of determin-
ing the annual income-generative capacity of the award."' 40 The court
noted that this "annuity analysis" was used in one California decision
but held that no such evaluation was required under Alaska law.4'
The methodology of determining loss of contributions for support
to the surviving beneficiaries by projecting decedent's probable future
income and subtracting his probable consumption was again approved
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Greer Tank and Welding v. Boett-
ger.42 In Boettger, Eugene Silberberg, an economist who testified on
behalf of the estate, projected the decedent's lifetime earnings at
$346,531. From this amount he subtracted $90,148, which repre-
sented "the percentage of $346,531 that the head of a family of five
living at home would normally spend on himself." The trial court,
sitting as the trier of fact without a jury, rejected the economist's total
for the decedent's lifetime earnings and projected decedent's lifetime
earnings at only $182,329.75. However, the trial court accepted the
$90,148 figure that the economist had projected as decedent's lifetime
personal consumption and deducted it from the $182,329.75. As a
38. The Alaska Supreme Court had held that probable future income taxes are
not to be deducted from probable future lost earnings between the time of trial and the
end of the probable working life expectancy, although they are to be deducted from
probable lost earnings from the time of injury or death until time of trial. Beaulieu,
434 P.2d 665, 672-73 (Alaska 1967).
39. 555 P.2d at 547.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 547 n.41 (citing Lucas v. Southern Pac. R.R., 19 Cal. App. 3d 124, 96
Cal. Rptr. 356 (1971)).
42. 609 P.2d 548, 552 (Alaska 1980).
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result, the trial court raised the percentage of decedent's lifetime per-
sonal consumption from approximately twenty-seven percent to al-
most fifty percent of his lifetime future earnings, even though there
was no evidence specifically indicating that decedent would personally
consume fifty percent of his income over his lifetime.43
Dr. Silberberg estimated that decedent, if he were living alone
and contributing only to the support of his two natural children,
would have personally consumed sixty-nine percent of his income. He
also estimated that the head of a family of five would have personally
consumed twenty-seven percent of his income. The supreme court af-
firmed the award of the trial judge on the basis that the lower court
"could reasonably have extrapolated his fifty percent consumption
from these two estimates above, in light of the evidence that [the dece-
dent] had four dependents rather than two, that his spending habits
were conservative, and that he was apparently maintaining a separate
residence." 44
The most recent Alaska Supreme Court case addressing damages
for loss ofacontributions for support to a surviving spouse, children, or
other dependents is Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian.45
Kavorkian, unlike Guinn and Boettger, was tried before a jury. In
Kavorkian, the court instructed the jury as to the proper method of
determining damages for wrongful death where the decedent was sur-
vived by a spouse and a daughter. In order to determine "the possible
loss of money or property that each beneficiary could have reasonably
expected to receive from [the decedent] had she continued to live,"'46
the jury was instructed as follows:
First, compute the amount the deceased would have earned had she
lived from the date of her death to the present and subtract from
that figure an amount representing the income taxes the deceased
would have paid on those earnings and also subtract an amount
representing what the deceased would have spent on herself had she
lived. Second, compute the amount of earnings the deceased would
have earned from the present to the end of her natural life expec-
tancy. Do not subtract the income taxes she would have paid but
do subtract an amount representing what the deceased would have
43. Id.
44. Id. at 552. The court, in affirming the "extrapolation" of the trial judge, re-
lied upon its dicta in Morrison v. State, 516 P.2d 402, 405 (Alaska 1973):
Certainly in many cases, as is true in this case, some items of damage cannot
be fixed with mathematical precision. In those instances the trial judge is
necessarily forced to estimate and as long as he follows the correct rules of
law, and his estimation appears reasonable and is grounded upon the evi-
dence, his finding will remain undisturbed.
609 P.2d at 552.
45. 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986).
46. Id. at 1046.
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spent on herself had she lived to the end of her natural life expec-
tancy. The sum of these two calculations is the amount the de-
ceased would have had available to give the beneficiaries. 47
The defendant, Tommy's Elbow Room, objected to this instruction
because it did not specifically require the jury to award to the surviv-
ing spouse and child the economic loss suffered by each as a result of
the wrongful death of the decedent. Instead, the instruction directed
the jury to follow the methodology approved in Guinn and Boettger:
to project the future income that decedent would have earned between
the time of her death and the end of her natural life expectancy, to
subtract from this amount the amount of her probable personal con-
sumption during this period, and to award the remainder as the net
economic loss suffered by the surviving spouse and child. The court
characterized the method as "a 'shorthand' method for another, more
exacting method in which the fact-finder attempts to specify the con-
tributions the deceased in fact would have made to her household
.... ,,4 The court observed that "[t]his 'shorthand' method is more
common and involves fewer computations." The court found "no er-
ror in using it.''49
The supreme court did criticize the instruction because it did not
"explicitly direct the jury's attention to how long each of the individ-
ual beneficiaries would have received contributions [for support]." 50
The court noted, however, that the economist who testified on behalf
of the beneficiaries called the jury's attention to each beneficiary's cir-
cumstances as they related to loss of contributions for support:
He told the jury that if Marie Kavorkian had lived, Sarah Kavor-
kian would presumably have left home after graduating from col-
lege, and that Sarah's recovery should reflect this fact. He also
emphasized that in computing the fair value of "assistance and serv-
ices" Ralph Kavorkian would have received, the fact that Ralph's
life expectancy was less than Marie's should be taken into
account. 51
The court also noted that the jury instructions and the verdict forms
instructed the jury to make separate awards for Ralph and Sarah
Kavorkian. Thus, the court held that the jury instruction was "not
incorrect, but incomplete" and, when supplemented by the testimony
of the expert, any error in the instruction was harmless. 52
47. Id at 1046-47.
48. Id. at 1047 (citing 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:6, at




52. Id In the text of its opinion, the supreme court refers to the decedent as
"Marie." In the instruction quoted above, the superior court refers to the decedent as
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Read together, Guinn, Greer, and Kavorkian indicate that where
the decedent is survived by a spouse, children, or other dependents, an
award of damages for loss of contributions for support will be deter-
mined as follows: first, the finder of fact must make a separate damage
award for each beneficiary based upon the circumstances of each.5 3
The proof of damages for loss of contributions for support for each
beneficiary will be determined by the amount that each beneficiary
could have expected for support between the time of decedent's death
and the end of decedent's probable life expectancy. If it is probable
that a child or other dependent would have ceased to receive contribu-
tion or support from the decedent at some time in the future, the fact
finder must consider that probability in making an award of loss of
contributions for support to that beneficiary. However, when at least
one of the surviving beneficiaries could have reasonably expected con-
tributions for support from the decedent from the time of decedent's
death until the end of decedent's probable life expectancy, the fact
finder may compute the measure of total loss to all the beneficiaries by
the "shorthand" method of projecting the gross amount decedent
probably would have earned from the time of his or her death to the
end of his or her probable life expectancy, deducting the amount that
decedent would have personally consumed and awarding the remain-
der as the total amount that would have directly or indirectly gone for
the support of decedent's spouse, children, or other dependents. The
finder of fact must then apportion this award among the spouse, chil-
dren, or other dependents according to the losses suffered by each.
2. Loss of Expectation of Inheritance. Paragraph (c)(1) of the
Alaska wrongful death statute directs the court or jury to consider
"deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits to the beneficiary
or beneficiaries," in addition to loss of contributions for support, in
determining the amount of damages to be awarded. Other jurisdic-
tions which measure damages for wrongful death by deprivation of the
expectation of pecuniary benefits to the beneficiaries permit the finder
of fact to consider those amounts that the decedent would have earned
and saved between the time of death and the end of probable life ex-
pectancy, and which the beneficiaries would have inherited, in fixing
"Gladys." Decedent's full name was Gladys Marie Kavorkian. "Gladys" and
"Marie" refer to the same decedent.
53. This principle was first stated by the Alaska Supreme Court in Horsford v.
Estate of Horsford, 561 P.2d 722, 727 (Alaska 1977). The court noted that the statute
is "silent as to whether or not the trier of fact should determine the loss suffered by
each surviving beneficiary and then make a separate award for each, or calculate the
loss suffered by each beneficiary, total such losses, and then enter a lump sum ver-
dict." 561 P.2d at 724. The court held that the proper method is for the trier of fact
to make a separate award for each beneficiary. Id. at 726.
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the damage award. This item of damage is generally called loss of the
beneficiaries' expectation of inheritance. 54
In Kavorkian, the court instructed the jury that it could award
the surviving beneficiaries of Mrs. Kavorkian money or property that
each could have reasonably expected to receive from Mrs. Kavorkian
had she continued to live. Furthermore, it told the jurors that "[t]his
item of loss includes both the loss, if any, of money and property,
including support, that the deceased would have given to each benefi-
ciary during the deceased's lifetime and any savings or accumulations
the deceased would have produced during her natural life and which
would have gone to the beneficiary on the deceased's death."55 The in-
struction was thus in accordance with the general rule that surviving
beneficiaries of the decedent are entitled to loss of expectation of inher-
itance, as part of "deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary bene-
fits." Apparently, no objection was made to this portion of the
instruction.
Some defendants have objected to recovery for expectation of in-
heritance in wrongful death awards because of the peculiar wording of
the Alaska statute. Their argument focuses on the language in para-
graph (c)(1) of the statute that directs the finder of fact to consider
"deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits to the beneficiary
or beneficiaries... without regard to probable accumulations of what
the deceased may have saved during his lifetime."5 6 These defendants
interpret this language to mean that in determining the pecuniary ben-
efits that the beneficiary or beneficiaries might have expected had the
decedent continued to live, the finder of fact may not consider
amounts the decedent may have saved from the time of his death until
the end of his natural life expectancy that would have been inherited
by his beneficiaries.
This argument is not persuasive for at least two reasons. First, in
determining the amount of an award of damages to the beneficiaries
for wrongful death, the finder of fact is not necessarily limited to the
six items of damage specifically listed in paragraph (c) of the statute.
54. 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:39, at 278. Speiser
states:
No less an authority than Tiffany, in the second edition of his pioneer
wrongful death treatise, published more than half a century ago, stated:
"Where the evidence shows that it is probable that the decedent, but for his
death would have accumulated property, which if he had died intestate,
would have been inherited by the beneficiaries of the action, these facts con-
stitute such a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits as to authorize a
recovery of damages for its loss."
55. 727 P.2d at 1046 (emphasis added).
56. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1983) (emphasis added).
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Under the wrongful death statute, the finder of fact shall limit dam-
ages to those "which are the natural and proximate consequences of
the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of the defendant and shall
fix an award that "will fairly compensate for the injury resulting from
the death." The six specifically listed items are circumstances that
"the court or jury shall consider but is not limited to" in fixing the
amount of the damages. For example, in Kavorkian the court ruled
that the jury could award the statutory beneficiaries damages for their
mental anguish resulting from the death of decedent, even though that
item of damage is not included in the specifically listed items of dam-
ages.57 The same reasoning that persuaded the Kavorkian court to
allow recovery of mental anguish should also allow recovery of loss of
inheritance, even if the court holds that loss of inheritance is not re-
coverable under paragraph (c)(1) as "deprivation of the expectation of
pecuniary benefits."
Second, a close textual analysis of paragraph (c)(1) does not man-
date the rejection of loss of expectation of inheritance as a recoverable
item of damage. The Alaska wrongful death statute directs the finder
of fact to consider, in determining the amount of an award, depriva-
tion of the expectation of pecuniary benefits "that would have resulted
from the continued life of the deceased and without regard to probable
accumulations of what the deceased may have saved during the life-
time of the deceased." An interpretation of this language that is at
least as reasonable as that of the defendants set forth above is that the
statute draws a distinction between "the continued life of the de-
ceased" and "the lifetime of the deceased." Under this interpretation
of the statute, "the continued life of the deceased" is the life that dece-
dent would have lived but for the wrongful death, and "the lifetime of
the deceased" is the life that decedent actually lived. The finder of fact
may award damages for amounts that the deceased probably would
have accumulated during his or her continued life (from the date of
57. 727 P.2d at 1048. See infra text accompanying notes 69-74. Even though the
supreme court in Kavorkian allowed recovery for mental anguish by the statutory
beneficiaries, the court made it clear that the wrongful death statute "is not to be
construed as open invitation to the jury to award damages from any or all injuries or
losses resulting from the death." 727 P.2d at 1046. The court held that it was revers-
ible error for the trial court to have instructed the jury: "In fixing the total amount of
the loss for each beneficiary, there are several items of loss that each beneficiary may
have suffered. I will describe each of these items for you, and you must consider, for
each beneficiary, each of these items of loss that you find was legally caused by the acts
of the defendants. You may also consider other items of loss suffered by each benefici-
ary and supported by the evidence in this case " Id. at 1045 (emphasis in original). The
court found the emphasized language "unnecessary and potentially confusing." Id. at
1046. The implication from the holding is that while the court is not necessarily lim-
ited to the six specifically included items of damage in the statute, the court must
specifically instruct the jury for what losses it may award damages.
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
death to the end of probable life expectancy) and which would have
been inherited by the beneficiaries, without regard to what the de-
ceased may have saved during his or her lifetime (from date of birth
until date of actual death). Read this way, the paragraph simply
means that the finder of fact can find that the beneficiaries could have
expected to receive pecuniary benefits, including inheritance, from the
continued life of the decedent, had he or she not died, even though the
decedent had not accumulated savings during his or her lifetime.5 8
Since the meaning of the statute is at best ambiguous, the court
should interpret the statute in a way that will result in awards of those
damages "which are the natural and proximate consequence of the
negligent or wrongful act or omission" of the defendant and that "will
fairly compensate for the injury resulting from the death." Such an
award of damages should include loss of expectance of inheritance.
3. Loss of Consortium. Paragraph (c)(4) of the Alaska wrongful
death statute directs the court or jury to consider loss of consortium in
determining the amount of the damage award. The cause of action for
loss of consortium has changed significantly over time. At common
law, a cause of action for loss of consortium existed in a husband
against a person who caused him to lose his wife's services, society,
companionship, and related conjugal benefits.59 The husband's cause
of action for loss of consortium was incident to the marriage relation-
ship and could not exist without it.6A A wife, however, had no cause
of action for loss of consortium of the husband. 61
The Alaska Supreme Court held in Schreiner v. Fruit 62 that both
a husband and a wife have a cause of action for loss of consortium
caused by negligently inflicted injury to his or her spouse. In
Hibpshmam v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc.,63 the supreme court ex-
tended the cause of action to allow minor children to recover for loss
of parental consortium resulting from injuries tortiously inflicted on
58. If this interpretation of the statute is correct, the intent of the legislature in
distinguishing "continued life of the deceased" from "the lifetime of the deceased"
could have been to defeat arguments such as that presented by the defendant in Krei-
dler v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 10 Alaska 365, 369-72 (1943). In Kreidler, the dece-
dent had accumulated only $410.55 during the 16 years between 1926 and 1942, the
year of his death. At his death, decedent was 73 years old and had a life expectancy of
6 years. The defendant contended that the court could not award more than 6/16 X
$410.55. The judge apparently found that decedent would have accumulated more
during his "continued life" than he did during his "lifetime" because he awarded
$1,600.00 as damages for pecuniary loss to decedent's estate.
59. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 450 (1968).
60. Id. § 447.
61. Id. § 457.
62. 519 P.2d 462, 466 (Alaska 1974).
63. 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987).
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the parent. Although Hibpshmam involved an injury, and not a death,
of the parent, the court relied on paragraph (e)(4) of the Alaska
wrongful death statute to recognize a minor child's claim for loss of
parental consortium.64 The court also recognized that the nature of a
claim for loss of consortium is not inherently sexual.65 The nature of a
spouse's claim for loss of consortium today is primarily for the loss of
the care, comfort, companionship, and solace of his or her spouse, and
the nature of a child's claim for loss of parental consortium is the loss
of enjoyment, care, guidance, love, and protection of a parent and for
deprivation of a role model.66
4. Grief and Anguish of Beneficiaries. Prior to statehood, dam-
ages for grief and anguish probably were not recoverable under
Alaska's wrongful death statute. In Dralle v. Steele,67 the United
States District Court for the Territory of Alaska, Third Division, held
that where a decedent is survived by a spouse and children, the recov-
erable damages are the pecuniary loss to the survivors, even though no
express limitation to "pecuniary loss" appeared in the statute. The
limitation of damages to pecuniary loss was in accord with the then
prevailing law in the majority of United States jurisdictions.68 Dralle,
however, was decided under the wrongful death statute as it existed
prior to the important 1955 and 1960 amendments.
In Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, the Alaska Supreme
Court for the first time addressed the issue of whether damages for
grief and anguish of the surviving spouse, children, or other depen-
dents of a decedent could be recovered in an action for wrongful death
under the Alaska wrongful death statute as it presently exists.69 The
court noted that the 1955 amendments provide for loss of consortium
and also for losses "which are the natural and proximate consequence
of the negligent or wrongful act or omission''70 of the defendant and
64. Id. at 994.
65. Id. at n.ll.
66. Id. at 993-94.
67. 13 Alaska 680, 687-88 (1952).
68. Id. See also S. SPEISER, supra note 55, at § 3:1.
69. 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986). The issue was alluded to by the Alaska
Supreme Court earlier in Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, 705 P.2d
446, 453 (Alaska 1985). The supreme court observed that "the Alaska [wrongful
death statute] does not expressly allow the widow and children to recover for their
own mental anguish." Id. (emphasis added). In light of the court's subsequent deci-
sion in Kavorkian, it appears that the court's use of the adverb "expressly" to modify
the verb "allow" was deliberate to leave open the question of whether the wrongful
death statute impliedly allowed recovery for mental anguish and other non-pecuniary
losses.
70. 727 P.2d at 1047.
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that a court or jury should arrive at an award that "will fairly compen-
sate for the injury resulting from the death."' 71 The court further
noted that the 1960 amendments add that recoverable damages should
be the "damages as the court or jury may deem fair and just.'' 72 The
court reasoned that "[i]f a jury can evaluate the intangible loss suffered
from not having the decedent's care, comfort and companionship,
then that same jury can be trusted to ascribe damages to grief" and
held that "when a jury finds that damages for pain and suffering are
necessary to 'fairly compensate for the injury resulting from the death'
or to render the award 'fair and just,' it may award them under the
wrongful death statute. '73
5. Punitive Damages. The Alaska Supreme Court also held in
Kavorkian that punitive damages may be awarded "when there is clear
evidence that the wrongdoer acted maliciously, fraudulently, or with a
wanton disregard for the decedent's safety."74 The court observed
that punitive damages are not favored in the law and that they are to
be allowed only with caution and within narrow limits. However, the
court emphasized its unwillingness to adopt the "incongruous result of
treating wrongful death actions differently than common law tort ac-
tions" with regard to punitive damages.75
C. Allocation of Settlements
1. Allocation Among Several Beneficiaries. Alaska's wrongful
death statute requires damages to be assessed according to the loss
suffered by each statutory beneficiary. 76 If an action for wrongful
death proceeds to trial, the trier of fact will make a separate award for
each beneficiary based on each beneficiary's loss. Actions for wrongful
death, however, like other tort actions, are usually settled without
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1048 (citing Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1977)). The court noted that other jurisdictions (California, for example)
have refused to allow recovery for pain and suffering in a wrongful death action. The
court stated that it agreed with the reasoning of jurisdictions such as Arizona that
hold that where a statute allows damages for loss of companionship, comfort, and
guidance, as does Alaska's under the 1955 amendments, "it would be inconsistent to
forbid recovery for the emotional pain suffered by a claimant as a result of the death."
Id. (citing City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 433, 466 P.2d 383, 387
(1970) (en banc) and Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 206 Mont. 325, 329, 671
P.2d 589, 592 (1983)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 45-53. See also Tommy's Elbow Room,
Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1047 (Alaska 1987); Horsford v. Estate of Hors-
ford, 561 P.2d 722, 727 (Alaska 1977).
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trial, and the amount for which the actions are settled is determined
by factors other than the losses suffered by each surviving beneficiary.
Factors which influence the amount for which an action for wrongful
death may be settled include the limits of liability insurance available
to the defendant, risk of loss, and potential expenses of litigation.
Where a personal representative has settled a claim for wrongful death
for a lump sum on the behalf of several beneficiaries, the issue of allo-
cation of the recovery among the beneficiaries becomes very real. If all
of the surviving beneficiaries are within the same nuclear family, the
apportionment and distribution of the recovery among them will ordi-
narily be agreed upon amicably. The interests of the beneficiaries may
be adverse, however, in cases where the decedent is survived both by a
spouse and by children of a prior marriage, or where the decedent is
survived by an "other dependent" who may be outside of the nuclear
family.
The issue of allocation of a settlement among multiple benefi-
ciaries was directly presented to the Alaska Supreme Court in Hors-
ford v. Estate of Horsford.77 William Horsford died in an airplane
crash, leaving a widow, Dorothy, and two children by a prior mar-
riage, William, Jr., and Mary, ages sixteen and fourteen, respectively.
Dorothy was appointed administratrix of the estate and com-
menced an action on behalf of herself, William, Jr., and Mary for the
wrongful death of William. The litigation was settled for the lump
sum of $350,000 without allocation of the recovery among the benefi-
ciaries. After payment of the court-approved costs and attorney's fees,
the net proceeds of the settlement available for distribution to the ben-
eficiaries was $225,864. Dorothy, as administratrix of William's es-
tate, proposed an allocation formula which was adopted by the trial
court. Under this formula, the court awarded to each of the benefi-
ciaries a proportion of the settlement amount based upon the "reason-
able and significant pecuniary expectations of the widow and the
minor children had William Horsford not died."' 78 The court first de-
termined the years which each of the statutory beneficiaries "could
reasonably have expected to receive significant benefits from the dece-
dent."' 79 The court determined that each of the children would receive
benefits until he or she reached the age, of majority, at that time
nineteen years, and that the widow would receive benefits for the bal-
ance of William's life expectancy. The number of years of dependency
of the widow and the number of years of dependency of the children
were made numerators of two fractions. The sum of all the years of
dependency of all beneficiaries was then made the denominator of the
77. 561 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1977).




fractions. The net proceeds of the settlement were then multiplied by
the fraction attributed to each beneficiary. The products obtained
were awarded to the beneficiaries accordingly. The results of this
formula and the actual payments ordered by the court pursuant to the
formula were as follows:80
Years of
Beneficiary Dependency Percent Distribution
Dorothy 27.80 27.80/35.05 or 79% $179,144.00
Children 7.25 7.25/35.05 or 21% $46,720.00
(Win. Jr. & Mary)
Total 35.05 35.05/35.05 or 100% $225,864.00
The children objected to this formula and argued that it con-
flicted with Alaska's laws of intestate succession, which provide that in
cases where a decedent leaves a surviving spouse and children, one
half of the estate passes to the children and one half to the surviving
spouse. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected this contention and af-
firmed the distribution ordered by the trial court. The supreme court
stated that "damages in a wrongful death case are to be assessed ac-
cording to the actual losses of each qualified surviving beneficiary"
and that it would be "illogical to infer that the legislature... intended
that distribution of such damages was to be based on the fortuitous
applications of Alaska's laws controlling inheritance of intestate es-
tates." 81 The court held that "the superior court's findings of fact
which supplied the foundational basis upon which the [allocation]
formula was applied are not clearly erroneous." 82
Justice Erwin dissented from the majority opinion.8 3 Justice Er-
win's primary objection to the majority opinion was that "it approv-
ingly allows a presumption founded upon the father's legal obligation
to support his children to control on the issue of 'actual loss' when
figuring the beneficiary children's reasonable expectable years of de-
pendency or loss."'8 4 Justice Erwin argued that children, and particu-
larly children who were not in the custody of a decedent at the time of
death, could reasonably have expected economic benefits from the de-
ceased parent after they attained their age of majority. Also, Justice
80. Id. at 725.
81. Id. at 726-27.
82. Id. at 728.
83. Id. at 730-31 (Erwin, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 730 (Erwin, J., dissenting).
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Erwin believed that the statistical probability of remarriage of dece-
dent's surviving spouse could create as much of a cut-off to her ex-
pected dependency as could attainment of the age of majority by the
children.
It should be emphasized that the only holding of Horsford was
that the allocation formula adopted by the trial court was not "clearly
erroneous" under the specific facts of that case. The allocation
formula employed in Horsford should not be followed slavishly in ap-
portioning damages where a decedent is survived by a spouse and chil-
dren or other dependents. As the court emphasized in Greer Tank
and Welding, Inc. v. Boettger, dependency under the Alaska wrongful
death statute is a question of fact, not a question of legal depen-
dency.85 Often it can be proved that the probable factual dependency
of a surviving child or other dependent would have existed long after
the age of majority, but for the wrongful death. Furthermore, a sur-
viving spouse, child, or other dependant may have expectations of in-
heritance from the decedent. In such a case, the provisions of the
decedent's will, or, if he left no will, the laws of intestate succession,
must be considered in allocating an award among the surviving benefi-
ciaries. Finally, the surviving beneficiaries may have incurred substan-
tial grief, anguish, and suffering as a result of the death of decedent.
The apportionment of such damages would depend upon the individ-
ual relationship of each surviving beneficiary to decedent and would
have little, if any, relation to the years of legal dependency of the sur-
viving beneficiaries.
2. Allocation of Survival and Wrongful Death Claims. When the
decedent has lived for a substantial period of time after injury, the
personal representative usually joins an action for damages on behalf
of the surviving spouse, children, or other dependents with one for
personal injuries to decedent suffered between time of injury and time
of death. Actions for damages for personal injuries suffered by dece-
dent prior to his death are brought by the personal representative
under the Alaska survival statute, which reads as follows:
All causes of action by one person against another, whether arising
on contract or otherwise, except those involving defamation of char-
acter, survive to the personal representatives of the former and
against the personal representatives of the latter, but this shall not
be construed so as to abate an action for a wrong where any party
has died after the verdict or to defeat or prejudice the right of action
given by AS 09.15.010. The personal representatives may maintain
85. 609 P.2d 548, 550-52 (Alaska 1980). See supra text accompanying notes 30-
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an action thereon against the party against whom the cause of ac-
tion accrued, or, after the party's death, against the personal repre-
sentatives of the party.
8 6
The recoverable items of damage under the survival statute are
those which decedent could have recovered but for his wrongful death,
including both special and general damages. The damages recovered
by the personal representative under the survival statute are not held
by the personal representative as a trustee for the exclusive benefit of
the surviving spouse, children, or other dependents but, rather, are
true assets of the decedent's estate. As a true asset of the estate, the
recovery is subject to claims of creditors and is distributed to the heirs
of decedent according to decedent's will or, in the absence of a will,
according to the laws of intestate succession. The allocation of the
proceeds of a settlement between the tort claims of decedent which
survive to decedent's personal representative and the tort claims of a
surviving spouse, children, or other dependents can be especially sig-
nificant due to the different treatment accorded each recovery.
The Alaska Supreme Court has addressed damages under the sur-
vival statute in only one case, Horsford v. Estate of Horsford, and there
only in the context of the proper allocation of an award. In Hors-
ford,8 7 the supreme court affirmed the allocation of an entire lump-
sum settlement for the wrongful death of a husband and father to
losses of the surviving spouse and children, with no part of the lump-
sum settlement allocated to the personal injury action of the decedent
which survived to his personal representative. The surviving children
attacked the superior court's allocation, contending that at least part
of the lump-sum settlement should have been allocated to the claim of
86. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.570 (1983). Prior to 1959, actions for personal injury
were specifically excluded from survival. Sections 61-7-1 and 61-7-2 of the Alaska
Compiled Laws Annotated 1949 read:
A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person dies with the person
of either party, except as provided in Section 61-7-3, but the provisions of
this chapter shall not be construed so as to abate the action mentioned in
Section 55-3-13, or to defeat or prejudice the right of action given by section
55-3-8.
All other causes of action by one person against another, whether aris-
ing on contract or otherwise, survive to the personal representatives of the
former and against the personal representatives of the latter. When the
cause of action survives, as herein provided, the executors or administrators
may maintain an action thereon against the party against whom the cause of
action accrued, or, after his death, against his personal representatives.
In 1959, the legislature amended these two sections to read as does the present sur-
vival statute.
It seems clear that the purpose of the amendment was to permit survival of ac-
tions for personal injury, particularly since actions for defamation are specifically ex-
cluded. If tort actions were not contemplated within "arising on contract or
otherwise," the exclusion of actions for defamation would be meaningless.
87. 561 P.2d 722, 729 (Alaska 1977).
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decedent for the conscious pain and suffering that he endured immedi-
ately prior to the airplane crash in which he was killed. As pointed
out in the discussion of Horsford above,88 the trial court awarded only
7.25/35.05 (twenty-one percent) of the settlement to the claims of the
surviving children. This award was based on a factual finding of the
probable years of dependency of the children and surviving spouse,
had decedent lived his probable life expectancy. If, however, a sub-
stantial portion of the lump-sum settlement could be allocated to the
surviving tort claim of decedent, then the proceeds of that portion of
the settlement must be awarded according to the laws of intestate suc-
cession, i.e., fifty percent to the children and fifty percent to the surviv-
ing spouse. The trial court refused to allocate any of the settlement to
the surviving claim of decedent for conscious pain and suffering be-
cause although "[i]t may very well be true that the decedent suffered
substantial pain, suffering and mental anguish arising out of the acci-
dent in question.., it is equally true that this pain, suffering, anguish
and other elements that are normally connected with a survivor action
came quickly and decisively to a tragic termination when the plane hit
the ground .... [A]ny portion of the total settlement that could be
allocable to the survivorship portion of the action would be insignifi-
cant in terms of the entire settlement amount."8' 9 The Alaska Supreme
Court affirmed the allocation of the trial court, finding that "there is
nothing in the record which indicates that any pain and suffering
which William Horsford may have suffered was other than momen-
tary." 90 The clear inference from the case is that where decedent did
suffer substantial pain prior to death, recovery for that pain may be
made under the survival statute.
While the decision not to allocate any of the settlement to dece-
dent's surviving claim for conscious pain and suffering was probably
correct under the facts of Horsford, the case is illustrative of problems
that can arise when allocating a lump-sum settlement to the wrongful
death claims of a surviving spouse and children and to the surviving
personal injury claim of the decedent. Due to the fact the monies that
are recovered by the personal representative as trustee for the claims
of the surviving spouse, children, and other dependents are not subject
to claims of decedent's creditors or to estate and inheritance taxes,
whereas those recovered on behalf of the estate for the surviving
claims of the decedent are, a plaintiff's attorney should seek to allocate
88. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
89. 561 P.2d at 730 n.22.
90. Id. at 729-30.
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as much of the award as possible to the wrongful death claim of the
surviving spouse, children, and other dependents. 91
IV. DAMAGES WHERE DECEDENT Is NOT SURVIVED BY A
SPOUSE, CHILDREN, OR OTHER DEPENDENTS
A. Loss to the Estate
The Alaska wrongful death statute does not specify what dam-
ages are recoverable in an action for wrongful death when a decedent
is not survived by a spouse, children, or other dependents. The stat-
ute, in pertinent part, provides:
When the decedent is survived by no spouse or children or other
dependents, the amount recovered shall be administered as other
personal property of the decedent but shall be limited to pecuniary
loss. 92
The language, "the amount recovered shall be administered as other
personal property of the decedent," originates in the Oregon statute
from which the Alaska wrongful death statute evolved and has sur-
vived basically unchanged in the existing Alaska statute.93 The early
Oregon cases and the Alaska territorial cases measured pecuniary loss
to the estate by the difference between the value of the decedent's es-
tate at the time of death and the probable value of the estate had the
decedent survived to the end of probable life expectancy. The trier of
fact determined this loss by considering
what the deceased would have probably earned by his intellectual or
bodily labor in his business or profession during the residue of his
life, and which, as representing his net savings, would have gone to
the benefit of his estate, taking into consideration his age, ability,
and disposition to labor, and his habits of living and expenditures.94
In In re Estate of Pushruk,95 the Alaska Supreme Court adopted
loss to the estate as the measure of damages where the decedent is not
91. An action for wrongful death may also be joined with one for personal injuries
to decedent where decedent is not survived by a spouse, children or other dependents.
In such a case, however, no problem of allocation to the separate claims exists because
damages recovered for both claims are true assets of the estate, subject to creditors'
claims and taxes, and distributed in accordance with decedent's will or, in the absence
of a will, in accordance with the laws of the intestate succession. See infra note 97.
92. ALASICA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1983).
93. The Alaska statute has not changed, with the exception of the two years be-
tween 1955 and 1957 when the statute provided that if decedent left "no husband, wife
or children surviving then in that event, [the amount recovered, if any, shall be exclu-
sively] for the benefit per capita of the child or children of the decedent's child or
children, if any, and the surviving parent or parents of the decedent." See supra text
accompanying notes 15-17.
94. Kreidler v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 10 Alaska 365, 367 (1943). See supra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
95. 562 P.2d 329 (Alaska 1977).
[Vol. 5:293
WRONGFUL DEATH
survived by a spouse, children, or other dependents. The court in
Pushruk stated that "if the deceased is not survived by the benefi-
ciaries named in the statute... [d]amages are limited to the loss to the
estate," and cited Alaska territorial cases in support of this proposi-
tion.96 The contested issue in Pushruk however, was not the proper
measure of damages, and therefore the statement was not a holding.
97
The issue of the proper measure of damages in cases where the
deceased is not survived by a spouse, children, or other dependents
was directly presented to the court in Osborne v. Rkessell. 98 In Os-
borne, the decedent died in an industrial accident. The decedent was
not survived by a wife or children. The defendant argued that the
proper measure of damages under the Alaska wrongful death statute
"is loss to the beneficiaries, such loss being equal to the value of prob-
able contributions which the deceased would have made to the benefi-
ciaries had he lived," whether or not the deceased leaves a wife,
children, or other dependents. 99 The supreme court rejected this argu-
ment and held that "if the deceased is not survived by the beneficiaries
named in the statute,. . . [dlamages are limited to the loss to the estate
and are distributed as other personal property of the deceased."lc°
Osborne is of greater interest, however, for its holding as to how
damages for pecuniary loss to the estate may be computed. The trial
court in Osborne instructed the jury as follows:
96. Id. at 331.
97. The primary issue in Pushruk was whether the proceeds of a $100,000 settle-
ment for the wrongful death of Mrs. Pushruk's son went directly to Mrs. Pushruk as a
"dependent" of the decedent or whether it went to the estate and, as such, was subject
to claims of creditors of the decedent. The court held that Mrs. Pushruk was not a
dependent of the decedent at the time of his death. 562 P.2d at 332-33. See supra text
accompanying notes 22-23.
98. 669 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1983).
99. Id. at 559-60.
100. Id. at 560 (quoting In re Pushruk, 562 P.2d 329, 331 (Alaska 1977) and citing
Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 69 (Alaska 1968)) (emphasis in the original). Leavitt
did not discuss the measure of damages in cases where the deceased is not survived by
a spouse or children, although the case was tried on the assumption that such was the
proper measure of damages. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court
erred in admitting into evidence certain charts prepared by an economist that con-
tained statistical data showing the average annual income of males in Alaska in cer-
tain age groups, certain areas, and in certain educational levels. The supreme court
upheld the admission of the charts, stating:
In determining the loss to an estate in a wrongful death action, the jury at
some point must make an estimate as to the decedent's lifetime income ex-
pectations. This must be arrived at largely through probabilities, and any
evidence that would reasonably tend to indicate the decedent's earning ca-
pacity in the future had he lived would be of assistance to the jury. We
believe that Professor Haring's data presented to the jury a reasonable basis
for assisting them in estimating the probable future earnings of the decedent.
443 P.2d at 70.
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In a case such as this where the deceased leaves no wife or children
surviving him, compensatory damages recoverable on behalf of the
estate of the deceased are limited to the following:
(1) pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased;
(2) damages for any pain and suffering experienced by the de-
ceased prior to death and caused by the accident.
Pecuniary loss to the estate is the amount of decedent's prob-
able future earnings diminished by the amount he would have spent
for his own living expenses had he lived.
Grief, sorrow, and loss of companionship, comfort or society
are not to be regarded as items of pecuniary loss for the purpose of
any award. 101
Defendant objected to this instruction because it failed to apply a
"net accumulations" measure of damages for loss to the estate. 10 2 The
net accumulations measure of damages for loss to the estate is the
measure that had been adopted by the early Oregon cases interpreting
the statute from which the Alaska wrongful death statute evolved and
by the Alaska territorial cases. 10 3 Under the net accumulations the-
ory, the loss to the estate is what the deceased would have accumu-
lated and saved from the earnings that he probably would have made
between the time of death and the end of probable life expectancy. In
other words, the recoverable damages under the net accumulations
theory is the difference between the value of decedent's estate at the
time of death and the probable value of the estate had decedent lived
to the end of probable life expectancy. The court noted that the net
accumulations theory "is in contrast to the more prevalent theory, and
the one applied by the [trial] court in this case, which is that the loss to
the estate equals the decedent's probable future earnings, diminished
by the amount he would have spent for his own living expenses had he
survived." 1 4 The court went on to state that:
Both theories begin by estimating the deceased's future gross in-
come due to his own efforts. They differ in what is to be deducted
from this amount; the net earnings theory deducts .only that amount
which the deceased would have spent on his own living expenses,
while the net accumulations theory deducts this amount plus
whatever amount the deceased would have expended on
dependents. 105
101. 669 P.2d at 559.
102. Id. at 560.
103. Perham v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 33 Or. 451, 467, 53 P. 14, 19 (1898);
Carlson v. Oregon Short-Line Ry., 21 Or. 450,457-58, 28 P. 497, 499 (1892); Dralle v.
Steele, 13 Alaska 680, 684-87 (1952). See also Macey v. United States, 454 F.2d 684,
687 (D. Alaska 1978) (adopting the net accumulations measure of damages where a
spouse, children, or other dependents do not survive the decedent).




The court noted that under the Alaska wrongful death statute, where
decedent is not survived by a spouse, children, or other dependents,
the amount which the deceased would have expended on dependents
between the time of his death and the end of his probable life expec-
tancy is necessarily equal to zero because the decedent had no depen-
dents at the time of his death and the possibility that he later would
have acquired dependents on whom he would have expended earnings
is too speculative a matter for the trier of fact to consider. Therefore,
the court reasoned that in cases where a decedent is not survived by a
spouse, children, or other dependents, the net earnings theory and the
net accumulations theory result in an identical damage calculation.106
The reasoning of the supreme court is theoretically and logically
correct. However, as a practical matter, measuring damages by a net
earnings theory results in a much larger award than measuring dam-
ages by a net accumulations theory because under Alaska law, the
amount that the decedent would have paid in taxes is not deducted
from decedent's probable future earnings in calculating loss of future
earnings.10 7 On the other hand, the trier of fact must base an award of
damages for loss to the estate on some evidence if the award is to be
something other than pure speculation. Statistics from the United
States Department of Labor and from the Alaska State Department of
Labor as to earnings and consumption patterns of classes of workers in
the United States and Alaska are available to calculate net earnings.1
0 8
Such statistics may not be available as to net accumulations of people
in Alaska. Therefore, the calculation of loss to the estate by equating
such loss to decedent's probable future earnings, diminished by the
amount he would have spent for his own living expenses, is probably
as good a measure of damages for loss to the estate as is possible given
the statistical information presently available.
B. Parent's Action for Wrongful Death of a Minor Child
In many cases brought under the Alaska wrongful death statute
where the decedent is not survived by a spouse, children, or other de-
pendents, the decedent is a minor child. In such cases, the parent of
106. Id.
107. Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967); State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d
530, 545 (Alaska 1976). See supra note 37. The United States District Court in Ma-
cey v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D. Alaska 1978), held that reduction of
an award for loss to the estate by the amount of taxes that decedent would have paid
in the future "is inherent in the 'net' [accumulations] concept," and, therefore, in
wrongful death actions against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
awards for loss to the estate will be reduced by the amount of taxes that decedent
would have paid in the future.
108. See, eg., State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 546-47 (Alaska 1976); Greer Tank and
Welding v. Boettger, 609 P.2d 548, 552 (Alaska 1980).
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the child may have a direct action for losses resulting from the wrong-
ful death of the child, in addition to the personal representative's ac-
tion for loss to the child's estate. The statute which provides for this
parental cause of action states:
A parent may maintain an action as Plaintiff for the injury or death
of a child below the age of majority. A guardian may maintain an
action as Plaintiff for the injury or death of a ward.109
At common law, a parent had no cause of action for his or her
losses as a result of the wrongful death of a child. A parent did, how-
ever, have a cause of action for loss of services of a child and for medi-
cal and other expenses incurred in curing or attempting to cure a child
who suffered wrongful personal injury. 110
Whether the statute creates a substantive cause of action on be-
half of the parent for the wrongful death of a minor child, or whether
it merely provides a procedural device allowing a parent to bring an
action on behalf of the estate of the child for loss to the estate, is an
issue that has yet to be addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court. In
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wainscott,1I the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska held that the section was pro-
cedural only and did not create an independent right of recovery in the
parent. Also, Justice Connor in a dissent in Wainscott v. Ossenkop1 1 2
stated that he thought "the federal court was correct in characterizing
this statute as 'of a procedural nature creating no independent right of
recovery in the parent.'"
In State Farm, the court analyzed and discussed in some detail
Mayhew v. Burns, 1 1 3 an 1885 Indiana case interpreting a similar Indi-
ana statute. The court in Mayhew held that the Indiana statute did
create an independent right of recovery in the parent, but the district
court chose not to follow that decision, reasoning: "If the court were
to read the section in question as creating substantive rights there is
nothing that would tie it to the limitations contained in the general
wrongful death statute. AS § 09.55.580."114 Surprisingly, the court
did not discuss the early Oregon cases decided under the Oregon stat-
ute from which the Alaska statute was taken verbatim when Congress
enacted Alaska's Civil Code in 1900. The early Oregon cases con-
strued the statute as supplementary to the Oregon wrongful death stat-
ute (under which the measure of damages was loss to the estate) and as
109. ALAsjLA STAT. § 09.15.010 (1983) (emphasis added).
110. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 934 (W. Keeton 5th
ed. 1984); 59 AM JUR. 2D, Parent & Child, §§ 97, 99 (1987).
111. 439 F. Supp. 840, 842-43 (D. Alaska 1977).
112. 633 P.2d 237, 248 (Alaska 1981) (quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. v. Wainscott,
439 F. Supp. at 843). The majority opinion in this case did not address the issue.
113. 103 Ind. 328, 2 N.E. 793 (Ind. 1885).
114. 439 F. Supp. at 843.
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creating in the parent a new right of action "for the death of the child,
as a right of action existed at common law for an injury to the child
for loss of services and incidental expenses .... 1
The decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court interpreting this stat-
ute prior to 1900 are more than merely persuasive authority. Thomas
Carter, who compiled an annotated code for Alaska in 1900, wrote:
"The codes were mainly copied from the statutes of the State of Ore-
gon, and to the end that adjudications by the Supreme Court of that
state might remain as directly in point as possible, changes were spar-
ingly made in the text of the sections." 116 In City of Fairbanks v.
Schaible, 1 7 the supreme court held that with respect to those statutes,
such as Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010, that were taken from the
Oregon laws and enacted into the Alaska code in 1900, "it is presumed
that [such statutes were] adopted with the interpretation that had been
placed [on them] by the Oregon Supreme Court prior to 1900.1118
The interpretation placed upon the Oregon predecessor to Alaska
Statute section 09.15.010 by the Oregon court prior to 1900 was that
the statute created a right of action in the parent for loss of services
and incidental expenses resulting from the death of the child. When
the statute was enacted as part of the Alaska code in 1900, it was
enacted with the interpretation that had been placed upon it by the
Oregon Supreme Court prior to 1900. Therefore, this writer believes
that State Farm was wrongly decided by the United States district
court. If the issue comes before the Alaska Supreme Court, the court
should reject State Farm and the comment by Justice Connor in the
dissent in Wainscott v. Ossenkop and adopt the construction of the
statute placed upon its Oregon predecessor by the Oregon Supreme
Court prior to 1900.119
115. Schleiger v. Northern Terminal Co., 43 Or. 4, 8-13, 72 P. 324, 326-27 (1903);
Craft v. Northern Pac. R.R., 25 Or. 275, 285, 35 P. 250 (1894); Putman v. Southern
Pac. Co., 21 Or. 230, 235-40, 27 P. 1033, 1035-36 (1891), aff'd on rehearing 21 Or.
244, 27 P. 1037 (1891).
116. T. CARTER, ANNOTATED ALASKA CODES xviii (1907) (emphasis added)
(quoted in City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 207 (Alaska 1962)).
117. 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962).
118. Id. at 207-08.
119. Gerald Salk and Robert Griffin argue that the language of subsection (c)(3) of
the wrongful death statute allowing recovery for "loss of... services irrespective of
age.., of decedent to the beneficiary or beneficiaries" creates a cause of action in the
parent for loss of services of a wrongfully killed minor child. Since permitting a par-
ent to recover for this loss of services under both subsection (c)(3) of the wrongful
death statute and Alaska Statutes § 09.15.010 would result in a double recovery, Salk
and Griffin argue that the 1955 amendment to the wrongful death statute "which
supplied the specifically enumerated items of recovery impliedly repealed Alaska Stat-
utes § 09.15.010." Salk & Griffin, Measure of Damages in Alaska for the Unlawful
Death of a Minor, 8 UCLA-ALASA L. REv. 1, 13 (1978). Whatever merit the argu-
ment might have had when written, it certainly is not sustainable since Osborne v.
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If the Alaska Supreme Court adopts the view urged here and
holds that Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010 creates an independent
right of action in the parent for injury to the child for loss of services
and incidental expenses, the potential recovery under that statute
could be substantial. Earnings of a child during minority belong to the
parent and are recoverable as loss of services. Although there is au-
thority to the contrary, under the majority rule the parent is entitled to
the gross value of the services lost to him as a result of the wrongful
death, including loss of earnings of the child, without deduction for
the cost of supporting the child.' 20 Often, substantial prospective
earnings of a once healthy, but wrongfully killed, minor can be
proved. In addition to the actual earnings of the minor, the loss of the
services in working in a family business or even around the home may
be large, particularly when the cost of hiring substitute labor is
shown.' 2 1 In addition to the loss of services, the parent may recover
all medical, funeral and other incidental expenses occasioned by the
wrongful death since the parent is legally obligated to provide these
necessaries. 122
Moreover, in addition to economic losses resulting from the
wrongful death of a minor child, a parent should be able to recover
damages for loss of consortium of the child. As discussed above,
Hibpshmam v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc. held that, in Alaska, not only
does a spouse have a common law cause of action for loss of consor-
tium caused by negligently inflicted injury to his or her spouse, but
also a child has a common law cause of action for loss of parental
consortium resulting from injuries inflicted on a parent. 23 Although
Hipbshmam does not expressly hold that the parent has a cause of
action for loss of filial consortium resulting from injuries inflicted on a
Russell, 669 P.2d 550, 560 (Alaska 1983), which held that "if the deceased is not
survived by the beneficiaries named in the statute... [d]amages are limited to the loss
to the estate.... ." See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text. See also Macey v.
United States, 454 F. Supp. 684, 687 (D. Alaska 1978) (holding that subsection (c) of
the wrongful death statute does not apply to actions for wrongful death of a minor
child who is not survived by dependents).
120. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child, § 104 (1987); Annotation, What Items of
Damages On Account of Personal Injury to Infant Belong to Him, and What to Parent,
32 A.L.R. 2D 1060 (1953).
121. This writer is aware of no recovery in Alaska under the statute. However, in
the New York case of Florence v. Goldberg, 57 A.D. 2d 914, 395 N.Y.S. 2d 57 (App.
Div. 1977), aff'd, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 583 (1977), a mother received a jury
verdict of $206,297.30 for loss of services-of a six-and-one-half-year-old son who was
injured in an automobile accident. The appellate division found the award excessive
and reduced the jury verdict in her favor to $125,000.00.
122. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child, § 103 (1987).
123. 734 P.2d 991, 993-94 (Alaska 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 63-
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child, the reasoning in the case certainly implies that such a right ex-
ists.124 If, as is argued here, Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010 gives to
a parent a right to recover for damages resulting from death of a child
to the same extent that at common law a parent could recover for
injury to a child, it follows that if a parent suffers loss of filial consor-
tium due to the wrongful death of a child, that parent has a right to
recover for the loss of that consortium. 125
V. EVALUATION OF ALASKA'S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
Although the Alaska wrongful death statute is, at best, inartfully
worded, its interpretation and application by the Alaska Supreme
Court usually results in fair and just awards of damages for wrongful
death where decedent is survived by a spouse, children, or other de-
pendents. Each beneficiary is entitled to the damages that he or she
can prove to have suffered as a result of the wrongful death of the
decedent. These damages include the loss of contributions for support
that the beneficiary could have expected to have received from the de-
cedent during his probable life expectancy and, if the argument ad-
vanced in this article is correct, any amounts that the beneficiary can
prove would have passed to him or her by will or intestacy. In addi-
tion, the beneficiary can recover damages for such intangibles as loss
of consortium and grief and anguish resulting from the wrongful death
of decedent.
In contrast, the dichotomous nature of the Alaska wrongful death
statute often results in unfair and unjust awards where a decedent is
not survived by a spouse, children, or dependents. In such cases, the
recoverable damages are not measured by the loss to any person, but
124. A parent had no cause of action at common law for loss of consortium result-
ing from injury to a child, and this rule has been followed by all jurisdictions until
recently. Recent decisions, however, have begun to recognize a cause of action in a
parent to recover for loss of filial consortium due to injury to a child. Frank v. Supe-
rior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986); Sizemore v. Smock, 155 Mich. App.
745, 400 N.W.2d 706 (1986), rev'd, 430 Mich. 283, 422 N.W.2d 666 (1988); Norvell v..
Cuyahoga County Hosp., 11 Ohio App. 3d 70, 463 N.E.2d 111 (1983); Shockley v.
Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
125. It should be noted that the cause of action under Alaska Statutes section
09.15.010 is not brought by the parent in a representative capacity as personal repre-
sentative of the estate of the minor, but is brought by him as an individual for his
personal loss. It is a separate cause of action and is brought separately from actions
under the wrongful death or survival statutes. Schleiger v. Northern Terminal Co., 43
Or. 4, 8-13, 72 P. 324, 326-27 (Or. 1903). However, under Rule 20 of the Alaska
Rules of Civil Procedure, a parent may join an action under Alaska Statutes section




rather by the loss to an artificial and abstract entity known as the es-
tate. That measuring damages by loss to the estate may lead to unfair
and unjust results may be seen by considering some hypothetical cases.
Case 1
The decedent at time of death was a young, unmarried medical
school graduate interning in a highly paid medical specialty. His
mother is deceased. He left no will. His sole heir under Alaska's law
of intestate succession is his father, from whom his mother was di-
vorced early in the decedent's life and with whom the decedent has
had hardly any contact since the divorce. A projection of the dece-
dent's expected future income, diminished only by his probable future
consumption during his probable life expectancy, will result in a pro-
jected pecuniary loss to the estate of millions of dollars. If the trier of
fact faithfully follows the instruction approved in Osborne v. Rus-
sell, 126 it will award this projected pecuniary loss as damages for the
loss to decedent's estate. The entire award will be distributed to the
father, as decedent's sole heir, although the father has suffered no real
loss.
Case 2
The decedent at the time of death was the same age as the dece-
dent in Case 1, but instead of being a medical intern was a subsistence
hunter and fisher residing in rural Alaska. His father is deceased. His
sole heir is his mother with whom he has lived since birth and with
whom he is extremely close. Although the mother is not dependent
upon the decedent at the time of death, it is probable that when she
became older, decedent, had he lived, would have been her primary
provider through his subsistence hunting and fishing. Decedent's pro-
jected probable future earnings, when diminished by his probable fu-
ture consumption, will result in a very small pecuniary loss to the
estate. Since his mother was not dependent on decedent at the time of
death, she cannot recover the value of what decedent would have con-
tributed to her in her old age. Furthermore, because she was not de-
pendent on decedent at time of death, she may not recover for her
grief and anguish at the death of her son nor for the loss of filial con-
sortium. Although the mother has suffered very real losses, the award
that will be distributed to her will be very small.127
126. 669 P.2d 550, 559 (Alaska 1983). See supra text accompanying note 101.
127. This hypothetical case is based on In re Estate of Pushruk 562 P.2d 329




Decedent at time of death was a wealthy, highly paid oil company
executive with a probable work-life expectancy of twenty years. He is
not survived by a spouse but is survived by adult children, none of
whom were receiving contributions for support from decedent and
none of whom had any expectation of receiving contributions for sup-
port in the future. Prior to his death, and with the belief that his chil-
dren were adequately provided for, deceased made a will leaving all of
his estate to a charity. Since decedent is survived by children, the
damages recoverable will be measured by the losses to the children.
The children will be entitled to recover damages (probably small) for
their loss of parental consortium and for their grief and anguish at the
death of their parent. The children will not be entitled to any recovery
for economic loss because they suffered no loss of contributions for
support and, because of the parent's will, they had no expectation of
inheritance. The charity that was the beneficiary of the will will not be
entitled to any recovery because it is not a surviving spouse, child, or
other dependent.
Case 4
The facts are the same as in Case 3, except that the decedent was
not survived by adult children. Because decedent is not survived by a
spouse, children, or other dependents, the measure of damages is the
loss to his estate, or an amount equal to decedent's probable future
earnings during his twenty-year probable life expectancy, diminished
only by the amounts he probably would have consumed during that
period. A projection of damages by this measure will result in a large
award. The amount recovered will go to the charity as the beneficiary
of decedent's will, as will the other personal property of the estate.
Something seems wrong in each of these hypothetical cases. Why
should a mother that suffers very real losses, both economic and emo-
tional, recover a small award, where a father, who suffered little or no
economic or emotional loss, would recover a large award? Why
should a damage award be significantly larger where a decedent leaves
no children than when he leaves non-dependent adult children? No
matter how intuitively wrong these results appear, they are inexorably
mandated by the Alaska wrongful death statute, at least as it has been
interpreted thus far by the Alaska Supreme Court.
The purpose of tort law is to compensate victims of wrongdoing
for the losses actually suffered by them. As the Alaska Supreme Court
stated in Beaulieu v. Elliott: "The general principle underlying the
assessment of damages in tort cases is that an injured person is entitled
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to be placed as nearly as possible in the position he would have occu-
pied had it not been for the defendant's tort."1 28 An award of dam-
ages to the personal representative of an estate for an alleged loss to a
decedent's estate is the only area in tort law where this principle is not
applied.
It seems that a more fair and just approach to assessment of dam-
ages for wrongful death would be to broaden the class of beneficiaries
entitled to recover damages for wrongful death to include not only a
surviving spouse, children, and other dependents, but also beneficiaries
entitled to inherit under the decedent's will, or, in the absence of a
will, under the laws of intestate succession; and to abolish loss to the
estate as a measure of damages for wrongful death. Such an approach
to the hypothetical cases stated above will achieve much more fair and
just awards.
In Case 1, damages will be measured by the loss to the father, as
decedent's sole heir under Alaska law of intestate succession. The
award will be small because the father lost no contributions for sup-
port, was deprived of no expectation of pecuniary benefits in the fu-
ture, and had little loss of filial consortium or grief and anguish over
the death of his son. On the other hand, in Case 2, measuring the
damages to the mother of decedent by the economic and emotional
losses she suffered will result in a substantial award. Although she
was not dependent on her son at the time of his death, she may be able
to prove substantial loss of future contributions for support and depri-
vation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits. Calculating the
amount of money necessary for the mother to purchase substitute
food, clothing, and shelter in the future that would have been provided
to her by her son had he lived his probable life expectancy will show a
substantial loss. Also, since she was close to the decedent, the amount
of money damages to compensate her for loss of filial consortium and
for grief and anguish over the death of her son will be substantial.
In Case 3, the adult children will recover for their loss of parental
consortium and for their grief and anguish over the death of their par-
ent. The charity, the sole beneficiary of decedent's will, will recover
for its deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits, which are
the accumulations that decedent would have saved from the actual
time of death until the end of his probable life expectancy. In Case 4,
the award to the charity will be the same as it was in Case 3, but the
total award will be smaller than in Case 3 because there will not be an
award to the adult children for loss of parental consortium and grief
and anguish.
128. 434 P.2d 665, 671 (Alaska 1967) (citing inter alia RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 924 comment d, at 634-35 (1939) and C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF DAMAGES § 86, at 304 (1935).
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To achieve such results under the wrongful death statute will re-
quire amendment of the statute. Such an amendment, however, would
serve the salutary purpose of allowing those actually injured by the
wrongful death of a person to be placed as nearly as possible in the
position that they would have been had it not been for the wrongful
death and, also, of eliminating the unfair and unjust results that can
arise by the application of Alaska's dichotomous wrongful death
statute. 129
129. For another and contrary view of the proper measure of damages for wrongful
death, see S. SPEISER, supra note 55, at § 15 (containing Speiser's Model Wrongful
Death and Survival Statute). Speiser argues that the measure of pecuniary damages
should always be the loss to the estate. Issues of pecuniary loss to specific benefi-
ciaries, according to Speiser, should pertain only to the distribution of the award, not
to the quantum of damages recoverable. Speiser also believes that non-pecuniary
damages, such as those for loss of consortium and for grief and anguish, should be
based on each beneficiary's loss.
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